

**INVIA**

# PROJET COFFI ANR-18-CES39-003

## VERIFICATION OF THE PROGRAM'S CFI BASED ON A TRACE ENCODER

**Anthony ZGHEIB**  
Journée thématique sur les attaques par  
injection de fautes  
23 Septembre 2021

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Methodology to verify the program's CFI
- 3 Exploited approaches
- 4 Results
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## Why is it necessary to guarantee the program's CFI?

- Software attacks : Buffer Overflow, ROP, Code Reutilization Attacks...
- Hardware attacks : Fault Injection...
- Example - Code pin verification :

```
int counter = 3;
void VerifyPin() {
1 →   if (counter > 0)
2 →     if (Cmp(userPIN,devicePIN))
        Accept();
        else
3 →     counter--;
}
```

- CFI Verification = Correct Program Execution.


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# How could we verify the program's CFI?

## Methodology


- Get information about what is executed at the RISC-V core level => Trace Encoder (TE)
- Compare these data to static data obtained from a static analysis of the binary program => Trace Verifier (TV)
- Detect if a fault injection attack is made => TV's output



## Definition

- Module designed by the RISC-V community.
- Overall objective: Compression of the program's execution path.
- Interpret the executed instructions from the RISC-V core.
- Report the discontinuities present in a program in the form of packets.
  - Instructions presenting an uninferable PC discontinuity.
  - Interruptions and exceptions...

# Packet generation example



## Example of a packet - Use Case

- Having a function call where the program encounter  $n$  branches.
- A packet will be sent containing : the number of branches ( $n$ ), the branch map (branch taken or not) and the return address ...



# Packet generation example

```
int fnct1(int a, int b, int c) {
    if (a=1) {
        ...
        if(b=2) {
            ...
        } else {
            ...
        }
        end if;
    } else {
        ...
    }
    if(c=a+b) {
        ...
    } else {
        ...
    }
}
return a+b+c;
}

int main() {
    int a = 1;
    int b = 3;
    int c = 4;

    c=fnct1(a,b,c);


    return 0;
}
```

Funct1 call →


# Packet generation example


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1 → int fnct1(int a, int b, int c) {  
    if (a=1) {  
        ...  
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            ...  
        } else {  
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        }  
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
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
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
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## Example (Generated packet)

- Number of branches : 3
- Branch Map : 010
- Return address


- It's verification system based on the TE sent packets.
- Compare the TE packets to static data issued from a static analysis of the binary program.
  - A static analysis is made after the compilation process.
  - Branch, jump, call and return instructions with their addresses are stored in a memory.
- A flag is raised when a fault is detected.

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
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# Exploited solution - Architecture




# First approach - ASIC RISC-V Model




- Verification process starts when a packet is sent.
- Navigation through the static data and constitution of the path followed by the program.
- Comparison process.

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
# First approach - FI detection

## Fault coverage

- Changing the return address of a function.
- Instruction skip on a function call.

## Particular cases

- Instruction skip on branch instructions.
- It depends on the branch number and return address.



## Limitations

- Corruption of a branch instruction (funct3, branch address ...).


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
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## Features


- We pull the PC and connect it to the TV.
- Calculation is made before receiving the packet.
- Verification process is faster compared to the first approach.



# Second approach - FI detection

## Fault coverage

- Changing the return address of a function.
- Instruction skip on a function call and branch instruction .
  - Total number of branches=4.



## Particular cases

- Changing the branch address in case it was taken : `beq a1005, a1005`

## Limitations

- Corruption of a branch instruction (func3, branch address ...).

## Features

- PC and executed instructions are pulled and connected to the TV.
- Adjustment to the TE RISC-V standard by defining the qualified instructions (jump, branch, return...).
- Packet is sent after each qualified instruction.

## Fault coverage

- Changing the return address of a call function.
- Instruction skip on a function call and branch instruction.
- Their corruption / substitution with other instructions.

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# Results - Comparison between the 3 approaches

- Each approach covers a specific number of threats :

Approach	SFC	RAC	SBI	CDI	L
TV-ASIC	✓	✓	(X)	X	- -
TV-FPGA-PC	✓	✓	✓	X	-
TE-TV-CFI	✓	✓	✓	✓	+

- SFC : Skip on function calls.
- RAC : Return address change.
- SBI : Skip on branch instructions.
- CDI : Corruption of a discontinuity instruction.
- L : Latency.

# Conclusion - Comparison between the 3 approaches

- Hardware Area Overhead (in terms of slices) :

Approach	TE	TV	Total
TV-ASIC	241	360	601
TV-FPGA-PC	241	641	882
TE-TV-CFI	95	575	670

- RISC-V IBEX : 635 slices.

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- Definition of a new packet for the basic blocks' verification, by adjusting the TE's standard.
- Verification of the correct instructions execution in the processor pipeline (cf. COFFI Project).





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